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ABSTRACT
This Article explores the feasibility of adding flexibility to mandates for existing power 
plants in order to foster technology innovation and reduce compliance costs and 
emissions. 
Under new and proposed EPA rules a significant portion of the coal-fired electricity 
generating capacity will require multi-billion dollar investments to retrofit and comply 
with emissions standards on SO2, NOx, PM, mercury, toxic metals, acid gases, coal 
combustion residuals, and cooling water intake rules.  A number of plant owners may 
find preferable to replace these plants with new units that run with today’s low cost 
natural gas.  Massive retrofit or replacement of the current coal-fired power generation 
fleet with today’s solutions will harm the conditions for research and development of 
path-breaking fossil-fired power generation technologies.  This would not be a serious 
problem if the current retrofit and replacement technologies were in fact a solution 
to the many environmental externalities posed by the coal-fired power plants that are 
now candidates for expensive retrofitting or retirement.  But the technologies available 
today are far from being a solution commensurate with the climate and environmental 
risks that fossil-fired generation poses in the United States and the world.  This Article 
finds that a policy with a flexible compliance payment that allows investors to delay the 
decision of retrofitting or replacing and hence, maintains incentives for innovation in 
retrofit and new plant technologies, can outperform an inflexible mandate by reducing 
compliance costs and improving environmental performance.
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. electricity industry cannot go on operating without major 
modifications.  Its impacts on the environment make it one of the worst global 
environmental offenders.  Its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions rank third after 
China and the United States at large.1  It contributes to ozone and fine particle 
(PM2.5) pollution, is the dominant emitter of mercury, and is a significant emitter 
of other toxic metals (such as arsenic, chromium, and nickel) and acid gases.2  
Coal ash and other combustion residuals create one of the largest waste streams 
in the United States, and coal plants together with other thermoelectric plants are 
responsible for almost 40 percent of freshwater withdrawals in the United States.3  
If life cycle impacts are considered, the picture just gets worse.4 
To tackle these problems, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), exercising authority under the Clean Air Act5, has finalized major envi-
ronmental regulations that, compounded with market forces, have the potential 
to dramatically change the landscape of the power-generation sector and forever 
displace coal as the leading fuel in the U.S. power-generation mix.6  The pro-
posed rules for new and existing plants aim at reducing water, soil, and air pollu-
tion and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.7  For owners of coal-fired plants, 
  
1. See generally Steven J. Davis et al., Future CO2 Emissions and Climate Change From Existing Energy 
Infrastructure, 329 SCI. 1330, 1333 (2010) (overviewing the current and expected emissions from 
electricity generation in the United States and the world). 
2. See generally Paul R. Epstein et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219 ANNALS N.Y. 
ACAD. SCI. 73, 73–98 (2011); PAMELA L. SPATH ET AL., LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT OF COAL-
FIRED POWER PRODUCTION, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., at i-iv (1999).  
3. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 73 (detailing the soil, water, and air emissions associated with the 
extraction, processing, transportation, and combustion of coal). 
4. Life cycle impact refers to the total impact on the environment of the U.S. electricity industry’s 
entire production cycle.  For example, the life cycle impact of a coal-fired power plant would 
account for all the emissions associated with the extraction, processing, transportation, and 
combustion of the coal used in that plant.  Epstein et al., supra note 2, at 73;  SPATH ET AL., supra 
note 2 (comparing the life cycle impacts of the average U.S. boiler, new boilers that meet new 
source performance standards, and highly efficient boilers that exceed those standards). 
5. CLEAN AIR ACT, 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq. (1970), available at http://www.epw.senate. 
gov/envlaws/cleanair.pdf. 
6. See Lincoln F. Pratson et al., Fuel Prices, Emission Standards, and Generation Costs for Coal vs. 
Natural Gas Power Plants, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4926, 4926–33 (2013) (describing how a 
combination of EPA rules and relatively lower natural gas prices changes the respective marginal 
costs of coal and gas electricity generation). 
7. See Cooling Water Intake Structures—CWA §316(b), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/316b (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (describing the 
proposed rule for cooling water systems for existing power plants); Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Management System: Identification and Listing of Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion 
Residuals from Electric Utilities, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.regulations. 
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compliance would require multimillion-dollar investments.8  This poses a signifi-
cant challenge for investors, given uncertainty about future growth of electricity 
demand and future regulatory constraints on GHG emissions.  Instead of being 
retrofitted, plants may be replaced with new coal-fired power plants or, more 
likely, with gas-fired power plants.9  In fact, a number of recent studies predict 
that between three and eighty-five gigawatts (GWs) of coal-fired capacity will be 
retired before 2020 because of the compounded effects of EPA rules, low natural 
gas prices, uncertain electricity demand growth, and potential limits on GHG 
emissions from existing sources.10 
But the simultaneous replacement of significant amounts of generation ca-
pacity from coal-fired power plants with natural gas-fired units will require the de-
velopment of massive infrastructure to extract, transport and store natural gas (and 
to export coal).11  Consequently, if the decision to switch from coal to gas turns out 
to have been ill-advised, reversing it will be exceedingly expensive (if not impossi-
ble), at least in the short term.12 
Another potential consequence of massive simultaneous investment that ei-
ther replaces or retrofits coal plants is that after such transformation has occurred, 
the demand for new fossil-fired power plants may be dramatically reduced.13  Un-
  
gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0640-0352 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) 
(describing proposed rules affecting coal ash management systems for existing coal-fired power 
plants); Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/mats/ powerplants.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (describing proposed air 
emission rules for existing power plants); What EPA is Doing, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/what-epa-doing (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) 
(describing proposed rules for regulating CO2 emissions from new and existing power plants).  
8. See generally DAVID FARNSWORTH, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, PREPARING FOR 
EPA REGULATIONS: WORKING TO ENSURE RELIABLE AND AFFORDABLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLIANCE (2011). 
9. Dalia Patiño-Echeverri et al., Should a Coal-Fired Power Plant Be Replaced or Retrofitted?, 41 
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 7980, 7980–86 (2007) (discussing the compliance alternatives for air 
emissions rules for coal-fired power plants). 
10. Blair Beasley et al., Mercury and Air Toxics Standards Analysis Deconstructed: Changing Assumptions, 
Changing Results 19 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 13-10, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2251261 (reviewing a number of recent studies on the impact of the 
EPA’s MATS rule on the electricity-generation sector). 
11. See Cong Liu et al., Coordinated Scheduling of Electricity and Natural Gas Infrastructures With a 
Transient Model for Natural Gas Flow, 21 CHAOS 025102-1, 025102-1 (discussing the 
interdependency of power and natural gas infrastructures). 
12. INGAA FOUND. & ICF INT’L, NATURAL GAS PIPELINE AND STORAGE INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECTIONS THROUGH 2030, 4 (2009) (projecting a range of investment from $133 to $210 
billion in infrastructure over the next twenty years to meet increased natural gas demand from the 
electricity-generation and industrial sectors). 
13. AEO2014 Early Release Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.eia. 
gov/forecasts/aeo/er/early_elecgen.cfm (follow “Interactive Table Viewer” hyperlink; Subject 
Filter: Electric Power Sector; Table: Electricity Generation Capacity; Region: No Regional Tables; 
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less there are abrupt changes in the U.S. technological and economic landscape—
massive electrification of the transportation system or increased industrial produc-
tion growth spurred by low natural gas prices, for example—electricity demand will 
remain constant or will grow by less than 1 percent.14  Thus, for at least the ex-
pected lifetime of the new replacement plants, there will be only a small need for 
new fossil-fired plants.  If plants are retrofitted rather than replaced, these retrofits 
would be made with the intention of continuing plant operation for two decades or 
more, which would also have the effect of reducing the size of the market for new 
plants.15 
Some pathbreaking electricity-generation technologies may become com-
mercially available in the near future if there is the expectation that a sizable and 
profitable market for them exists.  And if this is so, then replacing a large percent-
age of the electricity-generation capacity of the United States with the technology 
that is commercially available today may have two bad outcomes.  First, it may 
discourage and reduce the Research, Development and Demonstration (RD&D) 
expenditures of firms in search of game-changing technologies for fossil-fired 
electricity generation.  Second, even if firms continue investing and the 
pathbreaking technologies materialize, there may not be space for them in the 
marketplace.  This would not be a serious problem if the current retrofit and re-
placement technologies were in fact a solution to the many environmental exter-
nalities posed by the coal-fired power plants that are now candidates for 
expensive retrofitting or retirement.  But the technologies available today are far 
from being a solution commensurate with the climate and environmental risks 
that fossil-fired generation poses.  Current retrofit technologies for reducing 
emissions of conventional pollutants from coal-fired power plants have high capi-
tal costs and significant energy penalties that result in less electricity generation 
for the same fuel consumption.16  Similarly, replacing coal-fired power plants 
with natural gas units may reduce GHG emissions from the combustion phase 
  
select “Reference Case”; Row “Cumulative Planned Additions 9/”) (projecting coal-fired 
cumulative capacity additions of only 2.2 GWs throughout the outlook, which corresponds to no 
more than two large coal-fired power plants). 
14. Id. (projecting electricity demand growing at an average annual rate of 0.9 percent, and stating that 
“the combination of slow growth in electricity demand, competitively priced natural gas, programs 
encouraging renewable fuel use, and the implementation of environmental rules dampens future 
coal use”).  
15. See generally Dalia Patiño-Echeverri et al., Economic and Environmental Costs of Regulatory 
Uncertainty for Coal-Fired Power Plants, 43 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 578, 578–84 (2009) (discussing 
how large capital costs and long economic lives of retrofitted plants cause investors to plan over a 
long horizon). 
16. See id. at 580 tbl.1 (reporting the annual energy consumption of different emissions control 
technology for a coal-fired power plant). 
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by half, but it is uncertain whether life-cycle GHG emissions are reduced.17  Fi-
nally, even if we were certain of the environmental superiority of natural gas, 
there are several regions in the world where the scarcity and high cost of this re-
source point to coal as the most affordable solution to meet their needs for mas-
sive base-load power generation (for example, Japan after the closure of nuclear 
plants18 or developing nations with large underserved populations19).  For many 
of the coal-dependent developing nations, any policy that reduces the chances 
that breakthrough coal and gas technologies come to market in the short term di-
rectly harms their prospects for development.20  Hence, for a number of reasons, 
reaching ambitious GHG emissions–abatement goals requires more than just 
fuel switching from coal to gas, and there is value in keeping a good environment 
for the development of pathbreaking fossil-fired power-generation technologies. 
So, proceeding under the assumption that pathbreaking technologies for 
fossil-fired electricity generation are under development but not commercially 
ready for installation today, and that efforts on this RD&D activity would be 
greatly reduced if there is massive retirement of coal plants in the United States, 
this Article argues that postponing the retirement or retrofitting of some coal-
fired power plants would have economic and environmental benefits.  Since 
postponement of investment for some plants would be beneficial, this Article ex-
plores whether and how policy makers can design mechanisms that motivate op-
timal replacement timing (that is, investment timing that accomplishes the same 
environmental protection objectives at a reduced cost).  One such policy mecha-
  
17. Given that methane is a potent greenhouse gas (with a global warming potential equivalent to 
twenty-five times the warming potential of CO2 on a hundred-year horizon and seventy-two times 
the warming potential of CO2 on a twenty-year horizon), methane emissions during natural gas 
production and transmission have the potential to outweigh the environmental benefits derived 
from lower CO2 emissions from combustion in natural gas power plants compared to emissions 
from coal plants.  A recent study suggests that methane emissions due to fossil fuel extraction and 
processing could be 4.9 +/- 2.6 times larger than in EDGAR, the most comprehensive global 
methane inventory.  Scot M. Miller et. al., Anthropogenic Emissions of Methane in the United States, 
PNAS EARLY EDITION, Oct. 18, 2003, at 1, 5, available at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10. 
1073/pnas.1314392110. 
18. See generally Osamu Tsukimori & Aaron Sheldrick, Japan’s Soaring Coal Use May Push Down LNG 
Imports This Year, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2013, 3:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2013/11/ 
28/japan-power-outlook-idUSL4N0JB1AA20131128 (explaining that Japan was burning a high 
amount of coal as it tried to lower the cost of replacing nuclear energy). 
19. See generally SCOTT MORRIS & BILLY PIZER, CTR. GLOBAL DEV., THINKING THROUGH 
WHEN THE WORLD BANK SHOULD FUND COAL PROJECTS 5, 13–14 (2013) (arguing that in 
poor countries with limited access to hydroelectric and geothermal sources, coal may be the only 
alternative for obtaining reliable electricity, and hence that the World Bank should be ambitious in 
working toward clean energy approaches in its development strategies but should not rule out coal 
in all circumstances). 
20. Id. at 13. 
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nism is a flexible technology standard that would provide plant owners with the 
option to make an alternative compliance payment (FlexACP). This Article finds 
that under certain conditions, it is possible to create a FlexACP policy that can 
outperform a traditional mandate by both reducing cumulative emissions and 
improving economic efficiency. 
This Article is organized in three Parts.  Part I reviews the concept of flexi-
bility for environmental regulations and discusses the opportunities for flexible 
regulatory mechanisms under the Clean Air Act.21  Part II describes the invest-
ment decision problem facing the owner of an existing coal-fired power plant and 
the challenges of selecting a compliance strategy under uncertainty about fuel 
prices, future regulations, and technological advancement.  Part III proposes a 
framework for determining whether flexible technology policy can outperform a 
traditional performance standard, concluding that given available information on 
current retrofit and replacement plant technologies and an example of a poten-
tially path-breaking technology, it is indeed possible to design an economically 
efficient FlexACP that reduces SO2, NOx, and CO2 cumulative emissions.   
I. THE FEASIBILITY OF FLEXIBLE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS UNDER 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
A. Current and Expected Rules Affecting Existing Coal-Fired Power Plants 
Two major pieces of EPA rulemaking announced in 2011—the Cross-
State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR)22 and the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards 
(MATS)23—and the prospects of a near-term promulgation of a third rule limit-
ing CO2 emissions from existing sources (as required by the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) section 111(d)24 GHG rule) are at least partially responsible for the an-
nouncement of massive retirement of coal-fired generation.25  The estimated 
  
21. CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 5. 
22. Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPRP) U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www. 
epa.gov/airtransport/CSAPR (last visited June. 22, 2014). 
23. Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), supra note 7. 
24. CAA § 111(d) requires states to develop plans for existing sources of noncriteria pollutants (i.e., a 
pollutant for which there is no national ambient air quality standard) whenever EPA promulgates a 
standard for a new source. CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 5, § 111(d). These are called Section 
111(d) plans and are subject to EPA review and approval. See also Section 111(d) Plans, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region07/air/rules/111d.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
25. The Energy Information Administration reported that twenty-seven gigawatts (GWs) of capacity 
(representing 8.5 percent of total U.S. generating capacity in 2011) from 175 coal-fired power 
generators would be retired between 2012 and 2016.  27 Gigawatts of Coal-Fired Capacity to Retire 
Over Next Five Years, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 27, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/today 
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high compliance costs of these rules compounded with the low natural gas prices 
seen in recent years made the economic case for retiring older and less efficient 
coal-fired units.26  While the CSAPR has just been upheld after more than twen-
ty months of litigation,27 the MATS have been in force since 2011 with compli-
ance required by 2015, with possible extensions.28 
The CSAPR, finalized in July 2011, seeks to significantly reduce sulfur di-
oxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from existing power plants in 
twenty-eight states that, by emitting pollutants that cross state lines, make it dif-
ficult for downwind states to meet the ozone and fine particle National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).29  In August 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned the rule.30  The EPA contended 
that the Circuit Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it vacated the CSAPR and 
in March of 2013, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Circuit 
Court’s decision.  On April 29, 2014, the Court upheld CSAPR.31  The CSAPR 
sets SO2 and NOx annual and ozone emissions budgets for states based on con-
tributions to downwind NAAQS noncompliance, with budgets increasing in 
stringency for selected states over time. Regulated electricity generating units can 
comply with the rule through unlimited intrastate trading and limited interstate 
trading as well as pollution control options to reduce on site emissions.32 
The MATS, effective December 2011, reduces emissions of heavy metals, 
including mercury, arsenic, chromium, and nickel, as well as acid gases, including 
hydrochloric acid and hydrofluoric acid, from new and existing oil and coal-fired 
power plants by setting emissions limits for individual units.  The reduction of 
these hazardous pollutants would also reduce SO2 (an acid gas) and fine particle 
(PM2.5) emissions.  The rule has some degree of flexibility and allows sources to 
comply by averaging across multiple units.33 
  
inenergy/detail.cfm?id=7290.  These retirements would be higher than the previous five-year 
period and would be due at least in part to the high compliance costs of EPA rules.  Id. 
26. See, e.g., Beasley et al., supra note 10, at 27–28 (reviewing a number of recent studies on the impact 
of the EPA’s MATS rule on the electricity-generation sector). 
27. See Brief for Petitioner, United States Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EME Homer City Generation, 696 
F.3d 7 (2013) (Nos. 12-1182 & 12-1183) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
28. See Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), supra note 7. 
29. Clean Air Act supra note 5, 40 CFR part 50;  see also Envtl. Prot. Agency Clean Air Transport 
Rule, docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0491. 
30. EME Homer City Generation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 11-1302 (D.C. Cir.  2012).  
31. See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 27;  Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EME Homer City 
Generation, No. 12-1182, slip op. (U.S. 2013). 
32. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and 
Correction of SIP Approvals; Final Rule. EPA 40 CFR Parts 50, 51, 72 et al. http://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-08-08/pdf/2011-17600.pdf (last visited June 20, 2014). 
33. For a description of MATS and its flexibility, see Beasley et al., supra note 10.  
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To comply with MATS acid gas requirements and CSAPR annual SO2 
emissions budgets, nonretiring coal units without existing acid gas controls are 
projected to install wet and dry flue gas desulfurization controls or dry sorbent in-
jection.  Many coal units can comply with these regulations using existing acid 
gas controls, and some coal units are projected to comply by burning low acid gas 
coal.34  Compliance with MATS mercury and other toxic metal requirements is 
achieved through particulate control technology such as a fabric filter in combi-
nation with activated carbon injection.  Coal units with select catalytic reduction 
and wet flue gas desulfurization also control mercury emissions.  CSAPR annual 
and seasonal NOx emissions caps are projected to be met through selective cata-
lytic and noncatalytic reduction controls on some units.35 
Besides the CSAPR (or the CSAPR’s replacement) and the MATS, an-
other regulatory factor that has affected, and will continue to affect, capital in-
vestment decisions in existing coal-fired power plants is the prospect for a new 
rule that would constrain CO2 emissions.  In September 2013, the EPA pro-
posed a CO2 emissions standard for new power plants of 1100 pounds per mega-
watt-hour (lbs/MWh) for coal and small gas plants, and of 1000 lbs/MWh for 
large gas units over a twelve month operating period.  For coal plants, it is also 
possible to comply by achieving a CO2 emissions rate of 1000-1050 lbs/MWh 
over an eighty-four month (seven year) operating period.  Coal-fired power 
plants have a much higher compliance cost than natural gas plants since they can 
only meet the standard by installing carbon capture and sequestration equip-
ment.36  Because of this rule, no new coal-fired power plants are proposed in the 
short term.37  Under the Clean Air Act section 111(d), once the EPA formulates 
the rules for new plants, it has to do so for existing plants.38  Given that the new 
  
34. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, 
Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam 
Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63, available at  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-
02-16/pdf/2012-806.pdf (last visited June 20, 2014); Jennifer Macedonia & Colleen Kelly, BPC 
Modeling Results: Projected Impact of Changing Conditions on the Power Sector, BIPARTISAN 
POLICY CENTER (July 19, 2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/bpc-modeling-
results-projected-impact-changing-conditions-power-sector. 
35. JENNIFER MACEDONIA ET. AL, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION AND ELECTRIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY (2011). 
36. See generally JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43127, EPA STANDARDS 
FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM POWER PLANTS: MANY QUESTIONS, SOME 
ANSWERS 5–6 (2013) (discussing the new proposal). 
37. Id. 
38. See Section 111(d) Plans, supra note 24 (“Section 111(d) of the [Clean Air] Act requires states to 
develop plans for existing sources of noncriteria pollutants (i.e., a pollutant for which there is no 
national ambient air quality standard) whenever EPA promulgates a standard for a new source.”). 
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rules are finalized, the EPA needed to propose a standard for existing sources 
by June 2014 and issue the final rule by June 2015.  Following this requirement 
on June 18 EPA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking with guidelines for 
states to reduce carbon emission pollution from electric utility generating 
units.39  States will be required to submit an implementation plan by June 30, 
2016, consistent with the schedule laid out by President Obama’s climate plan 
which uses executive authority to reduce GHG emissions by 17 percent in 2020 
compared to 2005 levels.40 
B. Possibilities for Flexible Compliance Under the Clean Air Act 
Innovation is affected by three attributes of regulation: stringency, certainty, 
and flexibility.41  Stringency refers to the ambitions of the regulation and the 
burden of compliance imposed on firms.42  In general, more stringent regulations 
imply higher costs of compliance.  Certainty refers to the degree to which firms 
know what to expect from current and future regulations, in terms of stringency, 
flexibility, and timing.  Flexibility refers to the number of compliance alternatives 
available to the regulated entity.43  For the same level of stringency, a flexible 
regulation has the potential to reduce the compliance burden on firms and may 
also foster technological innovation.44 
Of the three attributes of regulation, flexibility is perhaps the one that policy 
makers can manipulate the most to achieve desirable outcomes.  The effect that 
one rule can have on regulatory uncertainty may or may not be under the 
policymaker’s control.  Also, it may be hard to change the stringency of a rule 
without compromising environmental goals.  In contrast, policymakers can 
increase or decrease the flexibility of a rule without necessarily compromising 
environmental protection objectives.45 
  
39. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 117 (proposed June 18, 2014). 
40. For a description of the President’s goals regarding carbon emissions for the power sector see EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (June 2013), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.  
41. Luke A. Stewart, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation in the United States: A Cross-Industry 
Literature Review 3 (June 2010) (unpublished paper), available at http://www.itif.org/pu 
blications/impact-regulation-innovation-united-states-cross-industry-literature-review. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id.; see also Dallas Burtraw & Matt Woerman, Technology Flexibility and Stringency for Greenhouse 
Gas Regulations 24 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 13-24, 2013) (analyzing the 
relationship between flexibility and stringency). 
45. Stewart, supra note 41. 
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The traditional inflexible approaches used to reduce air emissions from new 
and existing sources include performance standards based on what is technologi-
cally feasible.  Some standards for new sources set performance targets based on 
the best available technology, and others on maximum achievable controls tech-
nology, while standards for existing sources may be based on reasonably available 
controls technology.46  The economics literature contrasts these technology-
based approaches with more flexible incentive-based approaches.47  One example 
of a flexible approach is a cap and trade mechanism that allows units to comply 
either by meeting or exceeding an emissions target, or by buying emissions rights 
from firms that overcomply.48  Another example of a flexible approach is the im-
position of a tax on units of emissions.49  When comparing traditional technolo-
gy-based approaches with flexible price-based ones, both economic theory and 
empirical analysis find the latter more likely to result in the achievement of emis-
sions targets, reduce compliance costs,50 and promote technological innovation 
by providing incentives to reduce emissions beyond what is required.51 
At a first glance, the three pieces of regulation constraining the investment 
and operations of existing power plants have a low degree of flexibility.52  
However, the Clean Air Act does allow for some degree of  flexibility.  A number 
of programs under the Clean Air Act use market-based incentive approaches to 
  
46. See Summary of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/ laws-
regulations/summary-clean-air-act (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (stating that the Clean Air Act 
Amendment revision of § 112, which addressed emissions of hazardous air pollutants, requires the 
EPA to issue technology-based standards commonly referred to as “maximum achievable control 
technology” or “MACT” standards). 
47. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 57–78 (2d ed. 1988). 
48. See id. (discussing the advantages of tradable emission permits when abatement costs and benefits 
are uncertain); Steffen Brunner et al., Emissions Trading Systems: An Overview (Potsdam Inst. for 
Climate Impact Research, Discussion Paper) (reviewing different designs of cap and trade 
systems).  
49. See Richard G. Newell & William A. Pizer, Regulating Stock Externalities Under Uncertainty, 45 J. 
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 416, 418–19 (2003) (comparing cap and trade programs with taxes as 
policy mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions). 
50. See Joshua Linn et al., Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Coal Power Plants Under the Clean Air Act 2 
(Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 13-05, 2013). 
51. See generally Paul B. Downing & Lawrence J. White, Innovation in Pollution Control, 13 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 18 (1986) (providing a model of pollution control innovation); Wesley A. 
Magat, Pollution Control and Technological Advance: A Dynamic Model of the Firm, 5 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1978) (comparing taxes and standards and showing that these two pollution 
control policies lead to a distinctly different allocation of research and development funds between 
improvement in abatement technology and improvement in production technology); Scott R. 
Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control, 
17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247 (1989) (discussing five regulatory regimes and how they 
create incentives to promote technological change). 
52. Summary of the Clean Air Act, supra note 46. 
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achieve emissions reductions goals.  The Acid Rain Program is perhaps the best 
example of a successful flexible policy mechanism that is far superior to a com-
mand-and-control approach.53  The cap and trade mechanism of the Acid Rain 
Program allows sources to comply with whatever strategy is most economical.  
Plants may switch fuels, install scrubbers, or trade emissions allowances to com-
ply.54  As a result, during the last two decades the electricity industry has seen a 
reduction in SO2 and NOx emissions at a cost that is estimated to be about three 
billion dollars per year lower (50 percent less) than the cost of a traditional com-
mand-and-control rule.55  The Acid Rain Program is also credited for spurring 
technological improvements and cost reductions on emissions control equipment 
for coal-fired power plants.56  The fact that trading reduces compliance costs 
when firms have heterogeneous marginal costs of compliance is well supported by 
historical evidence and by economic theory.57 
In contrast, two other mechanisms of the Clean Air Act—new source per-
formance standards (NSPS)58 and new source review (NSR)59 requirements—
may have hindered innovation in emissions control technologies.  By increasing 
the capital costs of new plants, NSPS may have created incentives for keeping old 
coal plants operating beyond their economic life.60  Similarly, NSR may have sti-
fled innovation by creating disincentives to adopt innovative technologies because 
  
53. See generally Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from 
SO2  Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 70–71 (1998) (discussing added benefits of Acid 
Rain program). 
54. See A. Denny Ellerman & Juan Pablo Montero, Why Are Allowance Prices So Low? An Analysis of the 
SO2  Emissions Trading Program 1, 6, 9 (MIT Ctr. for Energy & Envtl. Policy Research, Working 
Paper No. 96-001, 1996). 
55. See Clean Air Markets, Acid Rain Program, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa. 
gov/airmarkt/progsregs/arp/basic.html#model (last updated July 25, 2012) (discussing the sulfur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxide reductions). 
56. David Popp, Pollution Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990, 22 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 641, 658–59 (2003). 
57. Stephen P. Holland et al., Greenhouse Gas Reductions Under Low Carbon Fuel Standards?, 1 AM. 
ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 106. 120 (2009). 
58. NSPS § 111 of the Clean Air Act authorized the EPA to develop technology based standards 
which apply to specific categories of stationary sources. These standards are referred to as New 
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and are found in 40 CFR Part 60. The NSPS apply to new, 
modified and reconstructed affected facilities in specific source categories such as manufacturers of 
glass, cement, rubber tires and wool fiberglass. As of 2005, there were approximately 75 NSPS. 
59. NSR: New Source Review is a Clean Air Act requirement to adopt state-of-the-art pollution controls 
when a stationary source undergoes major modifications.  
60. Garth Heutel, Plant Vintages, Grandfathering, and Environmental Policy, 61 J. ENVTL. ECON. 
MGMT. 1, 36–51.  (showing that more stringent performance standards for new sources decreased 
investment in new boilers.); James B. Bushnell & Catherine Wolfram, Enforcement of Vintage 
Differentiated Regulations: The Case of New Source Review, 64 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 2, 137–52  
(showing a reduction in investment in existing plants after heightened enforcement of NSR). 
1908 61 UCLA L. REV. 1896 (2014) 
 
of concerns that they may trigger the requirement to adopt state-of-the-art pollu-
tion control.61 
In recent years, the EPA has issued and proposed command-and-control 
mandates for existing sources that can be best classified as technology-based 
standards because they effectively require investment in a particular technology 
and hence have little compliance flexibility.62 But the CAA does not preclude 
the introduction of flexibility.  On the contrary, as argued by Jody Foster and 
Rob Brenner, the CAA promotes flexibility as a way to achieve environmental 
goals more efficiently.63  Foster and Brenner identify flexible regulatory mecha-
nisms available under the CAA that could accelerate the deployment of clean 
air and clean energy technologies.64  The first mechanism they identify is the 
State Implementation Programs (SIPs).65  They find that the CAA gives states 
great discretion in developing compliance strategies for SIPs.66  They argue that 
this discretion may permit the state to adopt innovative and alternative compli-
ance options.  As an example, they point out the possibility that the state au-
thority under section 111(d) to address GHG emissions from existing sources 
includes the authority to develop trading programs and other measures that 
may foster technological innovation to aid reaching the program’s goals. 
Another mechanism identified in the Foster and Brenner report is section 
111(j) on Innovative Control Technology Waivers, which provides compliance 
flexibility for sources seeking to deploy innovative technologies.67  This provision 
of the CAA provides extra compliance time for sources using new “first-of-a-
kind” technologies and allows the EPA to delay the application of new source 
performance standards (NSPSs) to these sources.68  The provision gives sources 
up to seven years after the waiver is granted or up to four years after the plant 
starts operating, whichever is earlier, to demonstrate the viability of the technolo-
gy.69  If the technology fails to reach viability, the EPA may grant the source up to 
  
61. See Howard K. Gruenspecht & Robert N. Stavins, New Source Review Under the Clean Air Act: Ripe 
for Reform, 147 RESOURCES 19, 22 (2002) (arguing that the new source review program wastes 
resources and can retard environmental progress); Dalia Patiño-Echeverri et al., Flexible Mandates 
for Investment in New Technology, 44 J. REG. ECON. 121, 145 (2013) (showing that new source 
performance standards for CO2 are likely to delay investment in new power plants). 
62. Summary of the Clean Air Act, supra note 46. 
63. JODY FOSTER & ROB BRENNER, NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, CLEAN 
AIR AND TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION: WORKING CONCEPTS FOR PROMOTING 
CLEAN TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2013). 
64. Id. 
65. See CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 5, §§ 107, 110, 113 (referring to state implementation plans SIPs). 
66. Id. 
67. CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 5, § 111(j)(1)(A). 
68. See Foster and Brenner, supra note 63; CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 5, § 111(j)(1). 
69. See Foster and Brenner, supra note 63; CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 5, § 111(j)(2). 
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three years to comply with the regular NSPSs.70  The EPA has used its regulatory 
authority to make this waiver applicable to the requirement of installing a Best 
Achievable Control Technology (BACT) stated by the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD).71 
A third mechanism is the Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) 
that are part of settlement agreements that resolve federal actions against compa-
nies in violation of environmental laws.72  As part of a settlement, alleged viola-
tors may agree to undertake an environmentally beneficial project related to the 
violation in exchange for mitigation of the fine to be paid.  Using this mechanism 
the EPA may persuade sources to invest in innovative projects in lieu of fines.73 
Although it may be challenging to design flexible standards for existing 
coal-fired plants, these three mechanisms for introducing flexibility indicate that 
it is possible to depart from inflexible standards.  Indeed, Dallas Burtraw et al. 
propose a tradable performance standard for CO2 that would set a uniform emis-
sions rate and allow generators that exceed the standard to generate and sell cred-
its to generators that do not meet the standard.74  In order to identify the design 
attributes of an effective flexible mandate, it is necessary to thoroughly under-
stand the tradeoffs associated with the various compliance alternatives open to 
owners of coal plants.  The next Part seeks to describe these tradeoffs in detail. 
II. THE DECISIONMAKING PROBLEM FACED BY OWNERS OF OLD  
AND DIRTY COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS AND THE VALUE  
OF THE OPTION TO POSTPONE INVESTMENT 
To the question “what to do with this plant?” there are at most four an-
swers: retrofitting, replacing, mothballing, or continuing operation of the plant 
  
70. See Foster and Brenner, supra note 63; CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 5, § 111(j)(2). 
71. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/NSR/psd.html (last visited June 22, 2014). 
72. Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator of the Office of Enforcement 
and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional Administrators of the Office 
of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Apr. 10, 1998), available 
at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/supplemental-environmental-projects-seps.  
73. EPA has proposed states use SEPs to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy.  See 
Memorandum from Brian McLean, Director of the Office of Atmospheric Programs, U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency and Walker Smith, Director of Office Regulatory Enforcement and Office of  
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional Air Division  
Directors, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,  (Jan. 27, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/sep_toolkit.pdf. 
74. See Dallas Burtraw et al., The Costs and Consequences of Clean Air Act Regulation of CO2 From Power 
Plants, 2 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 14-01, 2014) (comparing the outcomes of 
tradable performance standards and cap and trade approaches). 
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without modifications (in other words, waiting to make a decision).75  The last 
two alternatives—mothballing and operating an unmodified  plant—may not be 
available depending on plant characteristics and environmental rules.  The deci-
sion is a hard one, as it needs to be made under uncertainty about key variables 
affecting the profitability of any alternative, such as future fuel prices, costs and 
performance of future technologies, future regulations, and other factors. 
The decision tree depicted in Figure 1 illustrates the alternatives available 
at the first period of the decision and the subsequent alternatives available there-
after.  Possible retrofit alternatives include fabric filters, flue gas desulfurization 
systems (FGDs), selective catalytic reduction (SCR), carbon injection (CI), and 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) equipment.  Options for new plants include 
pulverized coal (PC) plants, PC plants with CCS equipment, integrated coal 
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plants, IGCC plants with CCS equip-
ment, natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) plants, and NGCC plants with 
CCS equipment.  The option to wait may not exist at all for two reasons.  First, 
the lead time required for installing retrofits or new plants may require making 
such decisions immediately in order to meet the tight compliance deadlines.  
(For example, to comply with MATS, coal-fired power plants must have SO2 
scrubbers by 2016, but it may take more than two years to install such equip-
ment). Second, a rule like MATS does not differentiate between plants that are 
operational or mothballed, and so mothballing a plant without bringing it to 
compliance is not an option.  Only plants that have to operate to ensure power 
grid reliability can be granted an extension in the deadline for compliance until 
2017.76  And depending on the plant's characteristics, some retrofit alternatives 
may not be available if they are inadequate to bring the plant into compliance 
with environmental rules.  (For example, a fabric filter alone would probably not 
meet the MATS requirements).  Finally, the alternatives of installing conven-
tional PC plants or IGCC power plants without CCS technology may be off the 
table, given that under the EPA's proposal, new coal-fired units would need to 
meet a CO2 emissions limit of 1100 lbs/MWh over a twelve month operating 
period, or 1000-1050 lbs/MWh over an eighty-four month (seven year) operat-
ing period, which cannot be achieved without at least beginning the installation 
of CCS technology as soon as the plant starts operation.77 
  
75. See Patiño-Echeverri, supra note 9. 
76. Memoradum from Cynthia Giles, Assistant Administrator of the Office of Enforcement and Com-
pliance Assurance, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional Administrators, Regional Counsel, Region-
al Enforcement Division Directors, and Air Division Directors, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Dec. 16, 
2011),  available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/prodution/files/documents/mats-erp.pdf. 
77. The EPA’s proposal gives coal units some compliance flexibility by allowing them to average 
emissions over multiple years.  This would allow plants to operate without CCS for some initial 
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FIGURE 1.  Decision Tree for the Investment Decision Facing Owners 
of a Coal-Fired Plant78 
A. Retrofitting or Replacing and Choosing Between Coal and Gas 
The costs of compliance with new and proposed EPA rules depend on the 
characteristics of the coal plant and the state’s implementation of such rules.  In 
many cases, compliance requires substantial retrofits even if the plants already 
have environmental controls.  For example, in its proposal to bring the Mills 
Creek plant into compliance with the CSAPR, the MATS, and the SO2 
NAAQS rules, Louisville Gas and Electric got approval from the Kentucky Pub-
lic Service Commission for retrofit plans with an estimated total cost of $1268 
  
years but would probably not allow for postponing the decision of investing in CCS given the 
construction lead time of this technology.  See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 37 (discussing the 
proposal). 
78.    The tree denotes the decisions that need to be made at each point in time and the uncertainties that  
are considered.  When making the decision in the first period, investors will consider the present  
value and probability distributions of all those variables affecting the outcome of each investment 
alternative (listed inside the blue ovals).  Decision alternatives that have been crossed out are those 
that may not be available depending on the plant and the state. 
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million79 (which averages out to 856 dollars per megawatt of net capacity 
($/MW)).80   
The decision to retrofit or replace is not an easy one and inevitably requires 
making assumptions about future fuel prices, emissions regulations, and the eco-
nomic lifetime of the retrofitted plant.81  Retrofitting an old coal-fired power 
plant may be the least costly alternative under a scenario that assumes three con-
ditions: (1) low coal prices relative to natural gas prices, (2) no future CO2 emis-
sions constraints for existing sources, and (3) usage of the retrofitted plant for the 
next two decades.  However, it may be the most expensive option under other 
scenarios, such as those with very low natural gas prices, moderate policies to con-
trol GHG emissions (such as moderate taxes), or early retirement of the retrofit-
ted plant. 
The example of a decisionmaker who is only concerned with uncertain fuel 
gas prices but does not regard those scenarios that increase constraints on GHG 
emissions from existing or new coal plants as plausible illustrates the difficulty of 
the decision whether to retrofit or replace.82  In this case, the decisionmaker is on-
ly concerned about the risks of choosing a technology that ends up having expen-
sive fuel costs.  Fuel cost is determined by the plant’s efficiency and the price of 
fuel.  While new and retrofitted coal- and natural gas–fired power plants have 
almost-constant generating efficiencies (of 38 percent and 50 percent respec-
tively), the prices of both fuels are expected to vary with time.83  The natural-
gas-to-coal fuel price ratio (NG2CP) provides a useful way to compare the cost 
of electricity between coal- and gas-fired plants.  In the last decade the NG2CP 
has varied between 1 and 5 with an average value of 3.5.84  Recently the 
  
79. Louisville Gas and Electric (LG&E) submitted these plans early—in anticipation of the 
regulations—and was one of the first utilities in the nation to do so.  The plans called for installing 
fabric filters (baghouse), activated carbon injection, and lime injection for sulfuric acid mist at the 
four generating units, improving the selective catalytic reduction equipment at units three and four, 
and installing new or upgraded flue gas desulfurization systems serving all units.   See generally 
David Hoppock et al., Determining the Least-Cost Investment for an Existing Coal Plant to Comply 
With EPA Regulations Under Uncertainty (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Working 
Paper 12-03, 2012) (discussing the LG&E case).  The estimated total cost of retrofitting Mill 
Creek to comply with CSAPR and MATS is $1268 million. Id. at 21 tbl.5.  Dividing this cost by 
the forecast net capacity of 1481.5 of net capacity (average of summer and winter capacities results 
in a retrofit cost of 856 dollars per megawatt of net capacity ($/MW).  Id. at 19 tbl.4. 
80. Id. 
81. See generally Dalia Patiño-Echeverri et al., supra note 9 (discussing the costs of such uncertainty). 
82. This is a hypothetical decisionmaker, not informed of § 111(d) plans—see CLEAN AIR ACT, supra 
note 5, § 111(d)—and not aware of the proposed rulemaking issued by EPA on June 18—see supra 
note 39.   
83. See generally AEO2014 Early Release Overview, supra note 13 (projecting price volatility of coal and 
natural gas for power generation in the baseline scenarios). 
84. Pratson et al., supra note 6, at 4930. 
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NG2CP has exhibited substantial fluctuations.  While in February 2007 
the NG2CP was at 4.6, in the spring of 2012—when natural gas prices ap-
proached a ten-year low close to two dollars per million British thermal 
units ($/MMBtu)85—the NG2CP reached an unusually low value below 1.  
For 2014, the average value of the NG2CP has bounced back to 1.61.86  
Given these large fluctuations in price, it is very difficult for investors to 
make long-term decisions between compliance alternatives. 
Figure 2 illustrates the challenges of choosing between retrofitting the ex-
isting plant or installing a new coal or gas plant given uncertainty about fuel 
prices.  The Figure shows the estimated levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for 
a retrofitted plant and for new coal- and gas-fired power plants, independent of 
future emissions controls or early plant retirement variables.  The model as-
sumes that possible retrofits include flue gas desulfurization systems (FGDs) to 
reduce SO2 and mercury emissions, selective catalytic reduction (SCR) to re-
duce NOx emissions, fabric filters (FFs) to reduce particulate matter (PM) and 
mercury emissions, and carbon injection (CI) to reduce mercury emissions.  
The model utilizes the costs and performance figures for these retrofit technol-
ogies that were reported in the Mills Creek proposal.87  The replacement coal 
plant is assumed to be a new supercritical pulverized coal (SCPC) plant fully 
equipped with a wet flue gas desulphurization system (WFGDs), SCR, an FF, 
and CI to control SO2, NOx, mercury, and PM emissions.  The natural gas 
plant is a natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) power plant.  For simplicity, the 
Figure assumes that coal prices stay at 2 $/MMBtu and that natural gas prices 
vary from 1.6 $/MMBtu to 15 $/MMBtu (which is equivalent to an NG2CR 
ranging between 0.8 and 7.5).  If natural gas prices are 3 $/MMBtu or lower, an 
NGCC plant should be chosen since its LCOE would be lower than the 
LCOE of a retrofitted coal plant or new SCPC plants.  If retrofit costs are 
higher than what is assumed here and investors are only considering new plant 
installations, then an expectation that natural gas prices will remain below  
5 $/MMBtu would motivate investment in an NGCC plant rather than in an 
SCPC plant. 
 
  
85. Id. at 4931 fig.4. 
86. See Electricity Monthly Update, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (MAR. 21, 2014), http://www. 
eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/resource_use.cfm (showing that the prices in December 2013 
for Central Appalachian Coal and Natural Gas Henry Hub were 2.72 and 4.38 dollars per million 
British thermal units ($/MMBtu), which results in a gas-to-coal price ratio of 1.61). 
87. See Hoppock, supra note 79 (presenting costs assumptions and analysis of the investment decision 
of Kentucky Gas and Electric regarding the retrofits of the Mills Creek Plant to achieve 
compliance with new and proposed EPA rules). 
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FIGURE 2.  Levelized Costs of Electricity for Retrofitted and New Plants 
The figure depicts levelized costs of electricity for a retrofitted plant and for new NGCC and SCPC plants as 
a function of varying natural gas prices.  Capital costs for the retrofitted plant are assumed to be 857 $/kW 
net.88  Capital costs for new plants are assumed to be 1853 $/kW net for SCPC plants and 778 $/kW net for 
NGCC plants.89  Capital costs are annualized assuming a fixed charge factor of 0.1128 and a capacity factor of 
75 percent. 
 
The model in Figure 2 is incomplete, however as it ignores potential legal 
requirements to install CCS in both new and existing plants.  The EPA’s pro-
posed GHG emissions standards for new plants find CCS as the Best System of 
Emission Reduction (BSER), and hence require new plants to achieve an average 
emissions rate that can only be achieved with CCS installation.90  Although EPA 
proposed rules for existing plants91 refrain from identifying CCS as a component 
of the BSER for existing Electric Generating Units (EGU), CCS could be man-
dated by states, as is available to States and sources as a compliance option.92  
Therefore, the true cost comparison ought to be between the cost of electricity for 
an NGCC plant and the cost of electricity for an SCPC plant or a retrofitted 
plant that also includes CCS, as shown in Figure 3.  Natural gas prices would 
have to be above 6.6 $/MMBtu to justify a CCS retrofit.  If NGCC plants were 
also required to include CCS equipment, then any natural gas prices above  
  
88. David Hoppock et al., supra note 79. 
89. As estimated by IECM version 8.0.2.  See Welcome to the Integrated Environmental Control Model, 
CARNEGIE MELLON, http://www.cmu.edu/epp/iecm/about.html (last visited Apr. 2013) (access 
Integrated Environmental Control Model (IECM) version 8.0.2 by clicking on “Download 
IECM” to access IECM program) [hereinafter IECM]. 
90. Carbon Pollution Standards for New Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units (EGUs), 79 Fed. 
Reg. at 1430. 
91. See supra note 39. 
92. See id. at 34,857. 
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4.6 $/MMBtu would make a CCS retrofit preferable.  If a CCS retrofit is not be-
ing considered (or is much more expensive than what is portrayed here), then 
natural gas prices would need to be above 11 $/MMBtu to make a new SCPC 
plant preferable to an NGCC plant.  If the new NGCC was also required to have 
CCS equipment, then any natural gas price above 7.5 $/MMBtu would justify 
building a new coal plant. 
 
FIGURE 3.  Levelized Costs of Electricity for Retrofitted and New Plants Including 
Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) Equipment 
The figure depicts levelized costs of electricity for a retrofitted plant and for new NGCC and SCPC plants 
that include CCS equipment as a function of varying natural gas prices.  Capital costs for all retrofits including 
CCS equipment are assumed to be 2019 $/kW net.  Capital costs for new plants with CCS equipment are as-
sumed to be 3232 $/kW net for SCPC plants and 1360 $/kW net for NGCC plants93.  Capital costs are an-
nualized assuming a fixed charge factor of 0.1128 and a capacity factor of 75 percent. 
 
In May 2014, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported 
a probability of about 20 percent that natural gas prices will exceed 5 $/MMBtu 
by August 2014.94  But uncertainty about long term natural gas prices remains 
high.  The EIA projections of natural gas prices for the next three decades differ 
by about 1 $/MMBtu depending on assumptions about the number of wells and 
the level of shale gas recovery per well.95 Growing demand for natural gas in Eu-
  
93. See id.  
94. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK. MARKET PRICES AND 
UNCERTAINTY REPORT, at  Figure 16 (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/ 
uncertainty/index.cfm. 
95. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 
2040, at 176 tbl.C3 (2013) (projecting that the price of natural gas delivered to electric power 
generators will grow steadily by 2 percent annually).  These projections predict natural gas prices for 
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rope and Asia (and the associated possibility that liquefied natural gas exports 
may raise domestic prices in the United States) exacerbates this uncertainty about 
future prices.96  Given this long-term uncertainty, the choice between a new coal 
power plant and a new natural gas power plant is not as easy as current prices may 
suggest. 
In summary, the prospects of low natural gas prices and GHG constraints 
on coal plants make the option of replacing existing coal-fired power plants with 
an NGCC plant look very attractive, but uncertainty about both variables may 
make investors prefer to wait until more information becomes available. 
B. The Option of Delaying the Investment Decision 
Given that capital investment decisions are for the most part irreversible and 
must be made under uncertainty about many variables that affect their outcome, 
the option of delaying investment until more information is revealed (or, in other 
words, waiting to make a decision) is often valuable.97  Regulations that take away 
this option can only decrease investors’ profits or leave them unchanged; in no 
case will eliminating this option increase profits.  As a consequence, investors 
may be willing to pay to keep flexible investment options available. 
The methods and techniques of real options valuation can be used to ap-
proximate the value of the option to wait or other options such as installing 
emissions controls in stages or mothballing an existing plant.98  These methods 
require regulators to identify investors’ expected uncertainty over time regard-
  
the years 2030 and 2040 of 6.05 and 8.38 $/MMBtu  respectively.  Id.  Under a low oil and gas 
resource scenario, the projected prices for the years 2030 and 2040 grow to 6.55 and 9.34 
$/MMBtu respectively.  Id.  All dollar amounts are in 2011 dollars.  Id.   
96. See International Energy Outlook 2013, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 46–47 (July 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/pdf/0484(2013).pdf (stating under the reference case, natural gas 
consumption in OECD Asia grows on average by 1.3 percent per year from 2010 to 2040 and that 
natural gas consumption in non OECD Asia grows on average by 3.3 percent annually).  The  
report also states that U.S. LNG exports are expected to start in 2016 and that export of LNG 
depend on a number of factors that are hard to anticipate and hence projections are highly 
uncertain.  Id. at 57. 
97. See generally Robert McDonald & Daniel Siegel, The Value of Waiting to Invest, 101 Q.J. ECON. 
707, 707–27 (1986). 
98. Real options theory is different from traditional net present value (NPV) analysis, which operates 
under the rule that investment should be undertaken whenever the expected NPV of revenues 
exceeds that of costs.  Under real options theory, investment should be undertaken only if the 
expected NPV of revenues exceeds the NPV of costs plus the cost of forgoing the opportunity to 
postpone the investment.  Real options theory recognizes that investment means killing the option 
to wait; given that the option to wait has value, killing this option implies a cost that needs to be 
added to the investment analysis.  See generally AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, 
INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994).  
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ing the variables that will affect the outcome of the investment decision (such as 
future coal and natural gas prices, future costs and performance of different 
technologies, and future environmental regulations).99  In this Article, I assume 
that investors’ uncertainty about the relative prices of coal and natural gas will 
remain the same over the next few years.  However, I assume that pathbreaking 
technologies are under development and are being tested in the next few years.  
Therefore, plant owners having the option of waiting to invest until the uncer-
tainty on the technology’s success is resolved could result in economic benefits 
for investors.   
Figure 4 illustrates the decision tree for an owner of an existing coal-fired 
power plant when the possibility of a pathbreaking technology for electricity 
generation is considered.100  Note that considering the possibility of a 
pathbreaking technology only makes sense if there is an option to wait until un-
certainty about the technology’s success is reduced or resolved; if the investor 
chose to retrofit or replace the coal plant, it would be prohibitively expensive to 
subsequently replace the newly-built plant with a plant that utilized the success-
ful pathbreaking technology. 
 
FIGURE 4.  Decision Tree for the Investment Decision Facing Owners  
of a Coal-Fired Power Plant When the Option of Paying an ACP Exists 
The tree denotes the decisions that an owner of an existing coal-fired power plant needs to consider when 
there is a possibility to pay an ACP to delay investment and find out if a pathbreaking technology for electrici-
ty generation is successful. 
 
How much investors should pay for the option to wait depends on at least 
two factors: (1) the probability that the pathbreaking technology will turn out to 
be viable; and (2) the economic benefits obtained by investors from replacing an 
  
99. The uncertainty on these variables can be described with a time-varying stochastic process such as 
geometric Brownian motion (gbm) or mean reverting processes.  See SAMUEL KARLIN & 
HOWARD M. TAYLOR, A FIRST COURSE IN STOCHASTIC PROCESSES (2d ed. 1975). 
100. This tree is a subset of the decision tree presented in Figure 1. 
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old coal plant with the pathbreaking technology.  In turn, the potential economic 
benefits of replacing an existing plant with a plant that utilizes the successful 
pathbreaking technology depend on two other variables: (1) the performance and 
costs of the pathbreaking technology; and (2) the capital and operating costs of 
retrofitting the existing plant or installing a new one.101 
As an example of a pathbreaking technology, I consider NET Power, an 
oxyfuel power cycle technology that promises cost-effective electric power with 
no air emissions.102  Shaw, Toshiba and Exelon have partnered with NET Power 
to build a twenty-five megawatt electrical (MWe) natural gas plant that utilizes a 
high-pressure, supercritical carbon dioxide cycle.103  The company has won a 
competition and has been granted £4.9 million from the U.K. Department of 
Energy.104 
If successful, the system would run with either coal or natural gas, and 
would have no air emissions other than pipeline-quality, high-pressure CO2.105  A 
NET Power plant would also be much more efficient than conventional technol-
ogies, allowing for significant reductions in the cost of electricity.  It is expected 
that a coal-fired NET Power plant would have an efficiency of 49 percent, while 
a gas-fired plant would have an efficiency of 53 percent.106  In comparison, a new 
SCPC plant—fully equipped with emissions-control equipment for SO2, NOx, 
  
101. See Patiño-Echeverri et al., supra note 61 (presenting an analytical model of the potential benefits of 
postponing investment in an immature technology such as CCS). 
102. See R.J. Allam et al., High Efficiency and Low Cost of Electricity Generation from Fossil Fuels While 
Eliminating Atmospheric Emisssions, Including Carbon Dioxide, 37 ENERGY PROCEDIA 1135, 
1135–49 (2013) (describing the NET Power technology). 
103. Jen Wilson & Toshiba Joins Shaw, Exelon on NET Power Project, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (June 15, 
2012, 1:47 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/news/2012/06/ 15/toshiba-joins-shaw-
exelon-on-net.html. 
104. NET Power Receives Grant from the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change to Support 
Development of Breakthrough, Clean Power Technology, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 21, 2012, 
http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/net-power-receives-grant-from-the-uk-department-
of-energy-and-climate-change-to-support-development-of-breakthrough-clean-power-techno 
logy-180322251.html. 
105. See Allam et al., supra note 102, at 1137. 
106. Id. NET Power reports expected efficiencies using the lower heating value (LHV).  All efficiency 
values in this Article are reported in High Heating Value (HHV) units. The heating value is the 
amount of heat produced by combustion of a unit quantity of a fuel. HHV is the amount of heat 
produced by the complete combustion of a unit quantity of fuel. It is obtained when all products 
of the combustion are cooled down to the temperature before the combustion and the water vapor 
formed during combustion is condensed.  LHV is obtained by subtracting the latent heat of 
vaporization of the water vapor formed by the combustion from the gross or higher heating value.  
The conversion from LHV to HHV depends on the fuel. Compared with LHV efficiency, HHV 
efficiency is 4 percent lower for coal and 10 percent lower for natural gas.  See NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, COAL: ENERGY FOR THE FUTURE 272 (1995).  
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mercury and PM107—would have an efficiency of 39 percent, while a new 
NGCC plant would have an efficiency of 50 percent.108  This turns out to be a 10 
percent efficiency gain for coal-fired NET Power plants over SCPC plants and a 
3 percent gain for gas-fired NET Power plants over NGCC plants.  Although 
this is already a significant improvement, these numbers do not reflect the true ef-
ficiency differentials between NET Power plants and traditional plants.  As dis-
cussed above, the current regulatory environment requires owners of 
conventional plants to install CCS equipment in order to meet stringent emis-
sions standards.  Therefore, the efficiency of a NET Power plant needs to be 
compared with that of a conventional plant that utilizes CCS equipment.  An 
SCPC plant with amine-based CCS has an efficiency of about 29 percent, and an 
NGCC with amine-based CCS has an efficiency of about 43 percent.  Compar-
ing these numbers to the efficiencies of NET Power plants reveals that the effi-
ciency advantages of the NET power system compared with conventional plants 
are 20 percent and 10 percent for coal- and gas-fired plants respectively.109  Figure 
5 shows that if the system can be scaled to larger capacities while meeting ex-
pected performance benchmarks, other technologies would be obsolete in com-
parison. 
 
FIGURE 5.  Levelized Costs of Electricity for New Plants with CCS and Net  
Power Plants 
The figure depicts Levelized Costs of Electricity for new NGCC and SCPC plants that include CCS equip-
ment and compares them to coal and gas-fired Net Power plants. 
  
107. See IECM, supra note 89. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. 
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III. FLEXIBLE MANDATES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO TRADITIONAL 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
Is there a flexible mandate that can achieve the same or superior environ-
mental goals as an inflexible standard while reducing compliance costs?  Previ-
ous work has examined the feasibility of designing a new source performance 
standard (NSPS) for CO2 that maintains the investor's option of building new 
coal-fired power plants without CCS equipment while at the same time accom-
plishing the same environmental goals of an NSPS policy that requires that all 
new coal-fired plants be installed with CCS equipment.110  This previous work 
shows that an environmental regulation in the form of a new source flexible 
technology standard with the option for plant owners to make an alternative 
compliance payment (FlexACP) is likely to achieve or exceed the environmental 
targets of a traditional inflexible NSPS.111  In this Part, I investigate whether is it 
possible to design a successful FlexACP policy for existing plants that gives plant 
owners the option to wait for pathbreaking technologies to materialize.   
Designing flexible mandates for existing plants is challenging in light of the 
fact that standards for existing plants target not only CO2 emissions but also 
SO2, NOx, mercury, and PM emissions.112  The additional difficulty derives not 
so much from the need to find different FlexACP values to meet emissions tar-
gets for each pollutant;  rather, the problem is that agreeing on a time value for 
those pollutants may be even more challenging than agreeing on the time value 
of CO2 capture.  Specifying a time value requires regulators to decide on an ap-
propriate discount rate to use for aggregating emissions across different periods. 
To keep things simple I will treat all emissions reductions as equivalent regard-
less of the time at which they occur, and consistently will not discount emissions 
reductions.113 
  
110. See Patiño-Echeverri et al., supra note 61. 
111. Id. at 142–46. 
112. The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) and the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards 
(MATS) target SO2, NOx, PM, and mercury emissions.  See generally Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
(CSAPR), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airtransport/CSAPR/ index.html 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014); Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), supra note 7.  
113. Using a discount rate of zero corresponds to the vision that reducing emission in the future is as 
important as reducing them in the present.  If present emission reductions were more valuable 
compared to the future then any policies that allow emitting in the present in exchange for 
increased emissions reductions in the future would need to be even more stringent and demand an 
even higher future emissions reductions.  For a discussion on discount rates and climate policy see 
Kenneth R. Richards, The Time Value of Carbon in Bottom-Up Studies, 27 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN 
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S279, S279-S292 (1997). 
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I begin by assuming that traditional existing source performance standards 
(ESPSs) are in place for each of the following pollutants: CO2, SO2, NOx, 
mercury, and PM.  Under this policy plants achieve compliance by installing 
pollution controls that bring emissions for each pollutant down to the standard.  
This Article proposes substituting FlexACPs in place of these ESPSs.  The 
FlexACP for each pollutant has two attributes: (1) the value of the alternative 
compliance payment (ACP); and (2) the year of expiration of the flexibility pe-
riod (denoted by v).  Under a FlexACP policy plants may achieve compliance 
by either installing pollution controls or paying ACPs for each unit of emis-
sions of each pollutant in excess of the prescribed standards for the duration of 
the flexible period.  If a plant owner opts to pay the ACPs, he must choose to 
either retire the plant or install pollution controls at the end of the flexible peri-
od.  I assume that the pathbreaking technology has a probability π  of proving 
to be successful at the beginning of year v.  To ensure that the FlexACP is a 
true alternative to the ESPS, it is essential that regulators select a flexibility pe-
riod that is equal to the time it will take to determine whether the pathbreaking 
technology is successful. 
For a FlexACP to be superior to an ESPS, it needs to achieve the same or 
higher emissions reductions at the same or lower cost.  Hence, the first condi-
tion for a successful FlexACP is that the expected net present value of cumula-
tive emissions under a FlexACP should not exceed cumulative emissions under 
an ESPS. 
A. Exploring the Creation of a FlexACP Policy That is Environmentally 
Superior to an ESPS Policy 
Estimating the emissions under a flexible or traditional policy requires mak-
ing assumptions about the compliance choices that investors will make.  As dis-
cussed above, an investor’s choice between retrofitting or replacing his plant will 
be determined by his beliefs about future fuel prices and emissions regulations.  I 
start by considering the case of a plant like Mills Creek, for which the best option 
today seems to be to invest in retrofits.  Under an ESPS, the plant would be retro-
fitted and operated for the remaining years of its economic life (denoted by T ).  I 
assume that the conditions that make retrofitting the preferred choice will remain 
the same at the end of the flexibility period; the plant will be retrofitted if the 
pathbreaking technology proves to be unsuccessful at that time.  Therefore, under 
a FlexACP, the plant will operate without retrofitting for v – 1 years; thereafter 
there is a probability π  that the plant will be replaced with a plant that utilizes 
the pathbreaking technology and a probability 1 – π  that the plant will be retro-
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fitted with conventional emissions control equipment.  Given that the 
pathbreaking technology is assumed to achieve greater emissions reductions than 
the conventional emissions control equipment, the expected cumulative emis-
sions under a FlexACP will be lower than those under an ESPS as long as the 
probability of success π  is high enough.   
Equation 1 states the first requirement for a successful FlexACP: namely, 
that the cumulative emissions under an ESPS (represented by the left-hand side 
of the Equation) are greater than or equal to the expected emissions under a 
FlexACP.  I use retrofite  to denote the annual emissions (for any given pollutant) 
of a retrofitted plant, uncontrollede  to denote the annual emissions of an uncon-
trolled plant, and beste  to denote the annual emissions of a new plant using the 
pathbreaking (best) technology. 
 
EQUATION 1. 
 
 
If the annual emissions of the retrofitted plant, the uncontrolled 
(unretrofitted) plant, and the plant utilizing the pathbreaking technology are 
known, then we can solve for the minimum value ofπ that would make the 
FlexACP have lower expected emissions than the ESPS policy.  Assuming that 
emissions controls for the given pollutant reduce emissions by a factor of 1 – R, 
then the remaining emissions of a retrofitted plant can be expressed in terms of 
those of an uncontrolled plant as: 
 
EQUATION 2. 
   
Assuming that the pathbreaking technology is the NET Power technol-
ogy discussed above, the emissions of a plant utilizing the pathbreaking tech-
nology can be expressed as: 
 
EQUATION 3. 
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By replacing the placeholders in Equation 1 with the emissions values in 
Equation 2 and Equation 3, we obtain an expression that allows us to calculate 
the minimum probability of success for the pathbreaking technology (the thresh-
old probability) that will make a FlexACP environmentally superior to an ESPS. 
 
EQUATION 4. 
Finding the threshold probability requires us to specify the planning hori-
zon (T ), the time until the success of the pathbreaking technology is known (v ), 
and the percentage of emissions remaining after pollution controls have been in-
stalled (R ).  Figure 6 illustrates the minimum value of π  that would make a 
FlexACP environmentally superior to an ESPS.  The threshold probability is 
presented as a function ofR , where the economic lifetime of the retrofitted plant 
is assumed to be thirty years and the success of the pathbreaking technology is 
known in year three. 
 
FIGURE 6.  Minimum Value of π  (Probability of Success of Path-Breaking Technology) 
That Would Make a FlexACP Policy Environmentally Superior to an ESPS Policy 
The Figure depicts the Minimum probability of path-breaking technology success that would make a flexible 
policy feasible.  The required probability of success depends on the efficiency of environmental controls as ex-
pressed in terms of the remaining percentage of emissions of a facility retrofitted with such control.  Graph as-
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sumes 30 years for the life time of a retrofitted plant and 3 years for the time before success of path-breaking 
technology is known. 
The R value for which π  is equal to 1 denotes the R value for which it is 
impossible to design a FlexACP policy that is environmentally superior to an 
ESPS policy.  In Figure 6, π  is equal to 1 when R  is equal to 0.07.  This 
means that for any pollutant for which there already exists an emissions control 
capable of reducing emissions by 93 percent or more, no FlexACP can possibly 
achieve lower cumulative emissions than an ESPS policy that mandates imme-
diate retrofit. 
Figure 7 assumes the pathbreaking technology is guaranteed to materialize 
in v  years (that is, π  is equal to 1) and shows the maximum value of R  for 
which an environmentally superior FlexACP does not exist.  For example, if we 
had to wait six years for the success of a pathbreaking technology, it would be im-
possible to find an environmentally superior FlexACP for any pollutant for which 
there are controls that can reduce emissions by 75 percent or more (in other 
words, the remaining emissions after retrofit are at or below 25 percent of their 
pre-retrofit levels). 
 
FIGURE 7.  Maximum Value of R  (Remaining Emissions From Conventional  
Emission Control) for Which a FlexACP Policy Environmentally Superior Than  
the ESPS Does Not Exist 
The Figure depicts the maximum efficiency of conventional emissions-control-equipment that would allow the 
existence of a superior FlexACP policy.  If remaining plant emissions are below this threshold plant owners 
should not wait until a path-breaking technology is ready for an installation. 
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This analysis shows that the efficacy of current retrofit emissions control 
technologies determines whether or not a FlexACP can be environmentally su-
perior to an ESPS.  Table 1 lists the emissions control equipment that could be 
used to reduce emissions for each type of pollutant from an existing coal-fired 
power plant, along with their respective R  values.  The efficacy of fabric filters at 
reducing emissions of particulate matter makes it impossible to design an envi-
ronmentally superior FlexACP for PM when the lead time for success of the 
pathbreaking technology is three years.  Similarly, fabric filters combined with 
carbon injection reduce 97 percent of the emissions of elemental mercury.  
Hence, for this pollutant it is impossible to design a sensible FlexACP. 
 
TABLE 1.  Efficacy of Emissions Controls in a Supercritical Coal-Fired Power Plant as 
Reported by Carnegie Mellon’s Integrated Environmental Control Model IECM  
Version 8.0.2.114 
Pollutant Emissions control equipment 
Emissions of 
uncontrolled 
plant 
(lbs/MMBtu)
Emissions after 
retrofit 
(lbs/MMBtu) 
R 
CO2 CCS Amine 204 20.4 0.100 
SO2 Wet FGD 3.117 0.6038 0.194 
NO2 Hot Side SCR 0.5656 0.12 0.212 
PM Fabric Filter 4.4 2.95E-02 0.007 
Mercury  
elemental Carbon Injection + 
Fabric Filter 
2.40E-06 7.19E-07 0.300 
Mercury  
oxidized 5.59E-06 1.68E-06 0.300 
Total Mercury 7.99E-06 2.40E-06 0.300 
All values assume the default IECM subcritical plant and emissions control configurations except for NOx 
where actual NOx removal efficiency has been set to 78 percent to achieve emission rate of close to 
0.12lbs/MMBtu.  The reported value of emissions after retrofit for each pollutant only considers the reduc-
tions achieved with the specific emissions control equipment.  If all controls are operated simultaneously there 
are synergies in their operation and emissions reductions of SO2 and PM are lower. 
For a FlexACP to be economically superior to an ESPS, the cumulative 
LCOE under a FlexACP over the lifetime of the plant must be less than or equal 
to the LCOE under an ESPS.  Once again, estimating investors’ costs under a 
flexible or traditional policy requires regulators to make assumptions about inves-
  
114. See IECM, supra note 89. 
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tors’ compliance choices.  Again, an investor’s choice between retrofitting or re-
placing his plant will be determined by his beliefs about future fuel prices and 
emissions regulations.  For illustration, I consider the case of an existing plant for 
which the best option today seems to be to replace the plant with a new plant uti-
lizing conventional natural gas or coal technology.  I assume that the conditions 
that make replacing the plant the preferred option will remain the same at the 
end of the flexibility period, so the plant will be replaced at the end of the period if 
the pathbreaking technology proves to be unsuccessful.   
Equation 5 shows the second requirement for a successful FlexACP, which 
is that the net present value of the LCOE over the lifetime of the plant under an 
ESPS (represented by the left-hand side of the Equation) must be greater than or 
equal to the cumulative LCOE under a FlexACP.  During the first v – 1 years, 
the LCOE under a FlexACP is equal to the LCOE of the uncontrolled plant 
plus the ACP (expressed in $/MWh).  From year v  on, the expected LCOE un-
der a FlexACP will be the LCOE of a new plant utilizing the successful 
pathbreaking technology ( besttLCOE ) multiplied by probability π , then added 
to the LCOE of the conventional new plant ( convtLCOE ), and finally multiplied 
by probability 1 – π .  The Equation assumes a discount factor td that brings to 
present value a monetary amount from future year t. 
 
EQUATION 5. 
 
Assuming the LCOE stays constant ( tLCOE k= for all t), we can drop 
the discount factor and solve for the maximum ACP (expressed in $/MWh) that 
an investor would be willing to pay: 
 
EQUATION 6. 
 
If the chances that the pathbreaking technology will be successful are null 
(π  = 0), then investors should be willing to pay up to the difference between the 
LCOE of the new conventional plant and the LCOE of the uncontrolled plant.  
However, if there is any chance that the pathbreaking technology will be success-
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ful, investors would be willing to pay an additional amount for the chance to save 
money in the future (since, as discussed above, the LCOE of a plant using the 
pathbreaking technology would be lower than the LCOE of a new conventional 
plant).  For any given positive value of π , the amount investors are willing to pay 
will increase as the difference between the LCOE of a plant utilizing 
pathbreaking technology and the LCOE of a conventional plant increases.  The 
longer the time until the pathbreaking technology will materialize, the less inves-
tors should be willing to pay.   
Figure 8 illustrates the maximum ACP that investors will be willing to pay 
given different levels of replacement technology and varying fuel prices.  Given 
the significant efficiency advantages of the pathbreaking technology, investors 
will be willing to pay a high ACP even when the probability of the pathbreaking 
technology’s success is low.  For example, investors would be willing to pay up to 
50 $/MWh or more (depending on the replacement technology being considered 
as an alternative) if the chances of a pathbreaking technology like NET Power 
emerging in the next two years were 10 percent or greater. 
 
FIGURE 8.  Maximum ACP Payment That Would Make a FlexACP Less Costly Than 
an ESPS Policy 
The figure depicts the maximum ACP payment (expressed in $/MWh) that would make a FlexACP less 
costly than an ESPS policy. It is assumed the probability that a pathbreaking technology will emerge is π, the 
planning horizon is thirty years, and the flexibility period expires in year three.  The SCPC line assumes that 
investors’ alternative would be to replace the existing plant with an SCPC plant and that fuel prices would stay 
at 2 $/MMBtu.  The NGCC lines assume that investors’ alternative would be to replace the old plant with a 
new NGCC plant .  NGCC1 assumes that natural gas prices stay at 3 $/MMBtu, while NGCC2, NGCC3, 
and NGCC4, assume prices of 5, 7, and 9 $/MMBtu respectively.  All lines assume that the uncontrolled plant 
has an LCOE of 20 $/MWh. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Incorporating flexibility into Clean Air Act115 regulatory policies for exist-
ing sources can potentially contribute to the development and deployment of 
much-needed innovative electricity-generation technologies without compro-
mising environmental goals or economic efficiency.  Given available information 
on current retrofit and replacement plant technologies, and using the NET 
Power plant as an example of a possible pathbreaking technology, this Article 
finds that it is possible to design a FlexACP that reduces SO2, NOx, and CO2 
emissions.  However, it is unlikely that a FlexACP can reduce emissions or low-
er emissions control costs for particulate matter or elemental mercury.  These re-
sults suggest that an ideal FlexACP policy that allows some plants to delay plant 
replacement or expensive retrofitting could be environmentally superior to an 
ESPS policy, so long as retrofits of fabric filters and carbon injection technology 
are timely installed.  Given this initial indication that it is possible to design a 
successful FlexACP policy, it may be valuable to explore in more depth the 
technical and legal aspects of the design of such a policy.  A thorough analysis of 
the outcomes of a FlexACP-type policy must look at its potential impacts in an 
equilibrium approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
115. See CLEAN AIR ACT,  supra note 5. 
